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Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in Fraud Analytics: Identifying the 
Main Data Protection Challenges for Public Administrations  
Thomas Tombal* (Namur Digital Institute, UNamur, Belgium, thomas.tombal@unamur.be) & Anthony Simonofski 





Fraud Analytics refers to the use of Big Data Analytics 
to detect fraud. Numerous techniques, from data mining 
to social network analysis, are applied to detect various 
types of fraud. While Fraud Analytics offers the promise 
of more efficiency in fighting fraud, it also raises data 
protection challenges for public administrations. Indeed, 
whether they use traditional or advanced techniques, 
administrations consistently use more and more data to 
deliver public services. In this regard, they often need to 
process citizen’s personal data. Therefore, 
administrations have to consider data protection legal 
requirements. While these legal requirements are well 
documented, the concrete way in which they have been 
integrated by public administrations in their Fraud 
Analytics process remains unexplored. Accordingly, we 
examine two case studies within the Belgian Federal 
administration (the detection of tax frauds and of social 
security infringements), in order to shed light on the 
main data protection challenges faced by public 
administrations in this regard. 
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1  Introduction  
 
The use of Big Data Analytics to detect tax fraud has been 
examined in previous research (Van Vlasselaer et al., 2017; 
Yu et al., 2003) and has been labelled as “Fraud Analytics” 
(Baesens et al., 2015). Fraud Analytics refers to a more 
global approach consisting of using analytics in fraud 
detection, investigation, confirmation, and ultimately 
prevention (Baesens et al., 2015; Pencheva et al., 2018). 
While Fraud Analytics offers the promise of more 
efficiency in fighting fraud, public administrations face 
additional constraints, such as the need to be trusted by the 
citizens and to comply with legal requirements. Indeed, 
whether they use traditional or advanced techniques, 
administrations consistently use more and more (big) data 
to deliver public services. In this regard, they often need to 
process citizen’s personal data, defined by the General 
Data Protection Regulation (hereafter “GDPR”)1, as “any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person” (Art. 4.1, GDPR).  When processing personal data, 
organisations have to comply with the citizens’ 
fundamental right to personal data protection2, which 
derives from their right to privacy.3 
 
While these legal requirements are well documented (see 
2.1), the concrete way in which they have been integrated 
in Fraud Analytics practices of public administrations 
remains unexplored. This is a key issue as the introduction 
of analytics in organisations without appropriate 
organisational change can lead to ethical challenges and 
privacy issues (Gal et al., 2020; Mai, 2016). Therefore, in 
this paper, we aim to address the following research 
question: “What are the main data protection challenges 
in the Fraud Analytics process?”. To do so, we first 
provide background information on some core data 
protection legal requirements, before identifying the 
research gap we aim to fill (Section 2). Then, we detail our 
methodology (Section 3) and we present the main data 
protection challenges that we have identified (Section 4), 
before concluding (Section 5). 
 
2  Background 
2.1  Data protection legal requirements 
 
Legal requirements for Fraud Analytics, which fit in the 
broader context of the legal requirements that must be 
considered by public administrations when employing 
analytics and algorithmic processes, are well documented 
                                                 
1 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46 (General 
Data Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 199/1. 
2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 
[2012] C 326/391, art. 8. 
3 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, art. 8; Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ [2012] C 
326/391, art. 7; Belgian Constitution, art. 22. 
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(Basin et al., 2018; Hildebrandt, 2019; Jones and 
Kaminski, 2020; Kaminski, 2019; van Noordt and 
Misuraca, 2020). Indeed, as for Big Data Analytics, the 
opportunities offered by Fraud Analytics must be balanced 
with the need to protect the citizens’ right to privacy and to 
personal data protection (De Raedt, 2017; Scarcella, 2019). 
 
In terms of data collection, the data must be collected fairly 
and transparently (Art. 5.1.a, GDPR). According to the 
purpose limitation principle (Art. 5.1.b, GDPR), personal 
data shall be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is 
incompatible with those purposes. According to the data 
minimisation principle (Art. 5.1.c, GDPR), only the 
adequate, relevant and necessary data for the fulfilment of 
the specific purpose of processing shall be processed. In 
terms of data analytics, any Fraud Analytics process must 
rely on a lawful basis of processing (Art. 6, GDPR). In 
practice, this will often be a law (Art. 6.1.c, GDPR), but 
this law needs to meet several requirements, such as being 
very specific regarding the purposes of processing it allows 
(Art. 6.3, GDPR).  
 
The GDPR also provides several rights to data subjects, 
which should be considered when employing data analytics 
(Art 12-21, GDPR). We highlight here two of these rights 
that will be further discussed below (see 4.2.3 to 4.2.5). 
The first is the data subjects’ right to information (Art 12-
14, GDPR), which mentions that data has to be processed 
fairly and in a transparent manner. Therefore, the public 
administrations shall take appropriate measures to provide 
any information to the data subjects about the data 
analytics in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily 
accessible form, using clear and plain language. The 
second is the data subjects’ right not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing (Art. 22, 
GDPR). While there are exceptions to this right, such as 
fully automated processing authorised by a law (Art. 22.2, 
GDPR), safeguards shall be implemented, such as the right 
to obtain human intervention (Art. 22.3, GDPR). 
2.2  Research gap 
 
While these legal requirements are well documented, the 
concrete way in which they have been integrated by public 
administrations in their Fraud Analytics process remains 
unexplored. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, no paper 
has taken a more concrete approach on how Fraud 
Analytics processes have been tailored, in practice, by 
public administrations to address these legal requirements, 
nor has identified the main data protection challenges faced 
by public administrations in doing so. 
 
3  Methodology 
 
In order to shed light on these main challenges, we 
examined two case studies within the Belgian Federal 
administration: the detection of tax frauds by the Federal 
Public Service (FPS) Finances and the detection of social 
security infringements by the Social Security Institutions 
(SSIs). We opted for two, rather than one, case studies as 
this improves the external validity of the research and 
allows drawing more general conclusions about the 
contextual factors in Belgium. Data from the cases were 
extracted through semi-structured interviews. Indeed, this 
qualitative method is effective when covering a complex 
topic in detail (Boyce and Neale, 2006). Moreover, this 
technique is relevant for our research question, as it centres 
around the expertise of the practitioners, and not around 
the validation of the knowledge of the researchers. In total, 
21 interviews were performed online, from August 2020 to 
December 2020, with stakeholders from different 
management levels (strategic, mid-level, operational) and 
different backgrounds (legal, IT, management). The 
complete interview guide can be found on the Zenodo 
platform.4 
 
4  Results 
4.1  Description of the two cases 
Before presenting how these legal requirements have been 
included by the FPS Finances and the SSIs in their Fraud 
Analytics processes, the general functioning of these two 
processes (i.e. the detection of tax frauds and the detection 
of social security infringements), is briefly presented. 
 
Regarding the tax fraud detection process, data is first 
extracted from several sources and prepared for analysis. 
Then, data mining is used to signal potentially fraudulent 
cases that need to be further examined. These two tasks (in 
grey) are performed by data miners. Then, at the pre-
investigation stage, the signals derived from the data 
mining tasks are enriched with data from other sources, 
and it is decided whether a proper investigation should be 
started. Finally, in the investigation stage, some of the 
potentially fraudulent cases are examined in-depth, with 
the support of analytics (e.g. text mining) to explore a large 
quantity of unstructured data. This stage is also referred to 
as e-auditing. These inspection tasks are performed by 
inspectors. Feedback is then given to data miners about the 
relevance of the signals. It must be noted that cases to be 
investigated are sometimes also suggested by “Input 
services” that manually detect cases to be further 
investigated.  
 
For the social security infringement detection process, it is 
important to understand that a “Social Security Network” 
                                                 
4 https://zenodo.org/record/4572708#.YD4POGhKg2w  
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was created by the law of 15 January 19905, in which all 
the Belgian Federal public SSIs are structured around the 
“Crossroad Bank for Social Security” (CBSS) (Degrave, 
2020). The CBSS acts as the core of the network, and the 
SSIs are the nodes.6  While these SSIs remain in control of 
their authoritative sources of personal social data, the 
CBSS acts as the central actor for the data sharing between 
them.7 The CBSS thus does not itself store any data, but 
rather acts as a “gatekeeper” that checks that an SSI has the 
right to access data stored on one of the nodes of the 
network (another SSI). 
 
Regarding social security fraud, there is a difference 
between the types of techniques used to detect fraud 
committed by beneficiaries of social allocations, on the one 
hand, and employers, health institutions, independent 
workers, etc., on the other hand. For the former, SSIs 
mainly rely on data matching techniques via bilateral 
cross-checks from other SSIs’ databases, aimed at 
identifying incompatibilities in terms of allocations. These 
are done either before or after the payment of the 
allocation. For the latter, social security institutions mainly 
rely on data mining techniques, through the use of the 
OASIS data warehouse, where larger quantities of 
pseudonymised data are compiled. Moreover, one SSI is 
currently developing a Big Data Analytics Platform to 
improve the data governance mechanisms between SSIs, 
notably to tackle social fraud. 
4.2   Main data protection challenges 
4.2.1 Ensuring reactivity to frauds while respecting 
purpose limitation 
 
For tax fraud, Article 3 of the Law of 3 August 20128 states 
that the FPS Finances can collect and process personal data 
to execute its legal missions, and that the data cannot be 
used for other purposes.9 Regarding, more specifically, the 
use of Big Data to fight tax fraud, Article 5.1, which was 
modified in September 201810, provides that the FPS 
                                                 
5 Loi du 15 janvier 1990 relative à l'institution et à l'organisation 
d'une Banque-carrefour de la sécurité sociale, M.B., 22 février 
1990. 
6 https://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be  
7 Art. 3 of the Law of 15 January 1990. 
8 Loi du 3 août 2012 portant dispositions relatives aux traitements 
de données à caractère personnel réalisés par le Service public 
fédéral Finances dans le cadre de ses missions, M.B., 24 août 
2012. 
9 Art. 3, al.1 and 2 of the Law of 3 August 2012.  
10 Modified by art. 71 of the Law of 5 September 2018 (Loi du 5 
septembre 2018 instituant le comité de sécurité de l'information et 
modifiant diverses lois concernant la mise en oeuvre du 
Règlement (UE) 2016/679 du Parlement européen et du Conseil 
du 27 avril 2016 relatif à la protection des personnes physiques à 
l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la 
libre circulation de ces données, et abrogeant la directive 
95/46/CE, M.B., 10 septembre 2018). 
Finances may aggregate data, collected to execute its legal 
missions, in a “data warehouse” enabling “data mining” 
and “data matching” operations, including profiling. This 
can only be done to carry out, in the context of its legal 
missions, targeted controls on the basis of “risk indicators” 
and of analyses on data coming from different 
administrations and/or services of the FPS Finances. 
Although this Article constitutes the lawful basis for such 
processing (Art. 6.1.c, GDPR), such law must clearly 
determine the specific purposes of processing that are 
allowed (Art. 6.3, GDPR). Yet, the critique formulated by 
(Degrave and Lachapelle, 2014) regarding the previous 
version of Article 5, namely that the purposes of data 
processing were defined too broadly in the Law, as they 
simply referred to the execution of the FPS Finances’ 
“legal missions”, have not been addressed in the 2018 
modification, as the same terminology is used. This might 
thus be problematic in terms of the validity of this Law as 
lawful basis for the processing, as well as in terms of 
compliance with the purpose limitation principle (Art. 
5.1.b, GDPR).  
 
However, this concern is somewhat alleviated as the data 
miners have to fill in a DAM (Data Access Management) 
fiche, which has to be validated by the President of the 
Executive Committee of the SPF Finances.11 In this DAM 
fiche, they have to state the objectives and purposes of the 
data mining and explain how it fits the organisation’s 
mission. The purpose limitation principle is thus 
implemented at the process level, but in a way that is not 
ideal from a democratic perspective (as Parliament does 
not define the concrete purposes of processing) nor from a 
legal perspective (as according to Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights12, Article 22 of the Belgian 
Constitution and Art. 6.3 GDPR, the key elements of 
personal data processing by public administrations, such as 
the processing purposes, must be clearly defined by law). 
 
Regarding the social security fraud case study, the use of 
data matching techniques relying on bilateral cross-checks, 
aimed at identifying incompatibilities in terms of 
allocations, must be subject to a data transfer protocol 
(DTP), as provided in Article 20.1 of the Law of 30 July 
201813, unless provided otherwise in specific laws (e.g., in 
Article 15 of the Law of 15 January 1990, as modified in 
September 201814, which requires, in some cases, a prior 
deliberation of the Information Security Committee (ISC)). 
The protocol, which must notably contain the purposes of 
                                                 
11 Art. 4, al.1 of the Law of 3 August 2012, as modified by Art. 
70 of the Law of 5 September 2018. 
12 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950. 
13 Loi du 30 juillet 2018 relative à la protection des personnes 
physiques à l'égard des traitements de données à caractère 
personnel, M.B., 5 septembre 2018. 
14 Modified by art. 18 of the Law of 5 September 2018. 
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processing, must be submitted to the Data Protection 
Officers of the SSIs involved in the sharing.15 However, 
they are not subject to a prior validation by the Data 
Protection Authority, which would bring more certainty in 
terms of the legitimacy of the purpose of processing. Once 
this purpose is achieved, the data must be deleted. 
 
SSIs also use data mining techniques. According to Article 
5bis of the Law of 15 January 1990, which has been 
inserted in September 201816, they may aggregate and 
process data in a data warehouse, enabling them to carry 
out data mining operations to prevent, establish, prosecute, 
and punish offenses against social legislations which fall 
within their respective powers. This data warehouse is 
known as OASIS and has existed since 2005. According to 
(Degrave, 2014, 2020) the purposes of processing in 
OASIS that are authorised by the law are not clearly 
defined, which could, here as well, be problematic in terms 
of the validity of this Law as lawful basis for the 
processing, as well as in terms of compliance with the 
purpose limitation principle. However, this concern is 
somewhat alleviated, although not optimally either from a 
democratic and legal perspective (see above), in the 
hypotheses contained in Articles 5bis, al.7 and 15 of the 
Law of 15 January 1990, as the authorisation to process 
data from the data warehouse must be subject to a prior 
deliberation by ISC, which will evaluate the purposes of 
processing. The purpose limitation principle is thus also 
implemented at the process level in the social security case 
study, as the purposes of the data matching or data mining 
operations have to be defined in advance, either in a 
protocol or in the file to be submitted to the ISC.  
 
The mechanisms mentioned above can be in conflict with 
the need for reactivity in Fraud Analytics. Indeed, in some 
cases, such as customs tax fraud detection, administrations 
have to react very quickly and getting the authorisations is 
time-consuming. Furthermore, it can be challenging to 
precisely define the exact type of fraud that they are 
investigating in advance, as this is sometimes broadly 
defined at the start and needs to be further refined with 
time. 
 
4.2.2 Balancing data minimisation with timely access 
to relevant data sources 
 
For tax fraud, Article 5 of the Law of 3 August 2012 
provides that the FPS Finance can use “data collected to 
execute its legal missions”. These are notably data 
collected from people’s and undertakings’ tax declarations, 
from the newspapers, from their own experience, from 
                                                 
15 Art. 20.2 of the Law of 30 July 2018. 
16 Inserted by art. 12 of the Law of 5 September 2018. 
whistle-blowers and from outputs of investigations. Once 
again, the critique formulated by (Degrave and Lachapelle, 
2014) regarding the previous version of Article 5, namely 
that the types of data that could be used were defined too 
broadly, as it provided that the FPS Finance can use, via 
the data warehouse, any “data collected in order to execute 
its legal missions”, have not been addressed in the 2018 
modification either, as the same terminology has been kept. 
This might be problematic from a data minimisation 
perspective. However, this concern is somewhat alleviated 
by the fact that, as outlined above, a DAM fiche must be 
completed and submitted to the President of the Executive 
Committee. This constrains the data that data miners can 
access for a specific project. This is a pragmatic solution, 
as it would be very difficult for the legislator to pre-define 
all the types of data that could be processed in this regard. 
Moreover, the technical access to the data warehouse is 
built in such a way that the agents of the FPS Finances can 
only access the electronic records, data or applications that 
are adequate, relevant and non-excessive in light of the 
execution of the tasks that fall within their legal missions17, 
and this can be checked through access logs. 
 
Regarding the data mining operations conducted in the 
OASIS database, Art 5bis of the Law of 15 January 1990, 
inserted in 2018, provides that “all the necessary data for 
the purposes of applying the labour law and social security 
legislation” can be used. This definition may be too broad 
as it does not allow the citizens to know exactly which 
types of data are (or can be) processed. However, this 
concern is somewhat alleviated by the fact that access to 
data from the data warehouse must be subject to a DTP or 
to a prior deliberation of the ISC, in which the necessary 
and proportionate nature of the accessed data will be 
controlled (see 4.2.1). The same goes for data matching 
operations. Moreover, the data minimisation principle is 
enshrined in the fact that the data warehouse solely 
contains pseudonymised data and that it can only be 
accessed by a limited number of data miners/investigators. 
Importantly, the people who pseudonymise the data to be 
uploaded in the data warehouse and suggest fraud 
indicators are not the same as those who use the 
datawarehouse in order to spot fraudulent patterns based on 
those indicators. 
 
The key is thus to be proportionate in the types of data 
collected and used. Even if administrations could 
potentially have access to troves of data, a balance must be 
found with the citizens’ data protection. This creates 
internal discussions about how much data they capture and 
how much data they may ask for in a timely manner. 
 
                                                 
17 Art. 10.1 of the Law of 3 August 2012. 
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4.2.3 Facilitating the access to information about 
Fraud Analytics for citizens 
 
As a rule of thumb, any Fraud Analytics processing must 
be fair and transparent, and the data subjects must be 
informed about it. Fairness implies that the laws on which 
this processing are based must be sufficiently explicit and 
understandable for the data subjects. They cannot be taken 
by surprise. For both case studies, citizens are generally 
informed about the existence of data matching and data 
mining operations through the laws mentioned above. Yet, 
according to (De Raedt, 2017; Degrave and Lachapelle, 
2014), these laws do not provide sufficiently clear 
information to the citizens, notably in terms of the concrete 
processing that will be conducted and in terms of the types 
of data that will be used (see 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). 
 
To some extent, this lack of transparency is reduced by the 
fact that these concrete data processing will be subject to a 
DAM fiche, to a prior deliberation of the ISC or to the 
conclusion of a DTP, which will provide more specific 
information. However, citizens do not have access to the 
DAM fiches. Moreover, while the deliberations of the ISC 
are published on the website of the CBSS18, it is hard to 
obtain information about a specific processing, as the 
search tool is quite basic. In a similar vein, as the DTPs 
have to be published on the websites of the relevant data 
controllers19, this leads to a diluted publication on a wide 
variety of websites, whose quality can strongly vary. This 
makes it almost impossible for citizens to have a good 
overview of the types of processing conducted with their 
data, and thus constitutes a major challenge to address. 
 
4.2.4 Ensuring a truly critical human check of quasi-
automated decisions 
 
For both case studies, it should be outlined that, as also 
underlined by  (De Raedt, 2017; Scarcella, 2019), even if 
the machine does not itself decide that a person is a 
fraudster, the decision to identify a person as “suspicious” 
could, in and of itself, be qualified as a solely automated 
decision producing legal effects for this person (i.e. the 
opening of an investigation). If this interpretation is 
followed, this would require implementing appropriate 
safeguards, such as the right to obtain a human intervention 
(Art. 22.3, GDPR). Moreover, questions could be raised 
about whether the human intervention remains sufficient, 
especially if the controllers do not question the fraud 
inspection suggestions they receive, as they completely 
rely on the machines to determine the cases to be 
                                                 
18 https://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.be/fr/deliberations-csi-
list?term_node_tid_depth=51  
19 Art. 20.3 of the Law of 30 July 2018. 
investigated. For instance, in the specific field of customs 
frauds, while some fraud indicators result from human 
knowledge, there is also an automated model that analyses 
all of the feedback from the controllers on a continuous 
basis and updates itself every day. Based on these updates, 
it will produce hundreds of updated selection rules every 
day to determine which goods/undertakings should be 
controlled. Therefore, only the feedbacks are provided by 
humans, not the rules inferred from them. In such cases, it 
is fundamental to ensure that the inspectors keep 
collaborating by giving feedback on those newly suggested 
indicators, rather than simply applying what the AI 
suggests, without any critical thinking. For instance, in the 
customs frauds example, feedback will be provided by the 
controllers, which implies that a human will assess the 
recommendations made by the machine, putting back 
human control in the process. Yet, looking towards the 
future, it is possible that, in light of the constant budget 
cuts and reductions of personnel, there is a risk that the few 
inspectors left will simply end-up trusting the machine 
without any critical thinking, because they have to meet 
their control quotas, and no longer have time to check the 
relevance of the indicators suggested by the machine. Such 
a scenario must be avoided. 
 
4.2.5 Balancing explainability with the need to ensure 
the confidentiality of Fraud Analytics process 
 
For tax fraud, data miners are able to explain the reasoning 
behind the detection (indicators, techniques applied, etc.). 
For social security infringements, automated bilateral ex-
ante cross-checks relying on data matching remain 
explainable because they are used to identify objective 
obstacles to the payment of the allowances. The machine 
thus does not have any margin of interpretation. Regarding 
bilateral ex-post cross-checks relying on data matching, 
their results are also explainable, since they always imply a 
human verification. Similarly, the results of the data 
mining operations conducted in the data warehouse are 
also explainable, since the indicators that are used to 
pinpoint suspicious cases have, in fact, been suggested by 
humans (the data miners). 
 
However, it should be outlined that, for both case studies, a 
person or an undertaking will not be informed that it has 
been flagged as a potential fraudster following data mining 
operations if the follow-up investigation did not result in 
the finding of fraud. Moreover, they will not receive an 
explanation about why this is the case. This shows that 
even if administrations can explain their decision, the 
challenge is to determine when and how they should do it. 
Indeed, it is complex to find a balance between being fully 
transparent about the data mining processes and models 
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used, and the need not to disclose their Fraud Analytics 
processes, as otherwise the fraudsters might adapt and 
avoid being detected. 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Our research has enabled us to identify the main data 
protection challenges faced by public administrations in 
the Fraud Analytics process. As a final take-away, we 
suggest ways forward to address some of them. For the 
first challenge (4.2.1), we argue that to ensure reactivity to 
frauds while respecting purpose limitation, the data 
processing authorisation request could be slightly broader 
at first, and then refined continuously throughout the 
process, via close collaboration between legal services and 
data miners following agile analytics principles. Another 
solution direction would be to anonymise, or at least 
pseudonymise, the data warehouse data on which the data 
mining analysis is done, and to only allow the re-
identification of the data subjects in the context of a 
concrete human-led investigation. This would ensure 
privacy-by-design and by-default (Art. 25, GDPR) and can 
prevent data processing mistakes. For the third challenge 
(4.2.3), we believe that in order to facilitate access to 
information, a solution would be to centralise the 
publication of all of the DTPs in a single source, such as 
the Data Protection Authority’s website. A good example 
of this is the city of Amsterdam’s “Algorithm register”.20 
Moreover, it should be possible to search through this 
single source, as well as through the Information Security 
Committee’s deliberations on the CBSS website, on the 
basis of several criteria, such as the types of purposes or of 
data concerned. 
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